In Braugh v. Dow, a default judgment was determined to be void because the summons and complaint were served by the plaintiff — a party to the action. The court reasoned as follows:

  “‘[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction.  [Citation.]  Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.’  (Dill, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1444.)  As mentioned above, under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may ‘set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper service.  (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.)

  “Section 414.10, entitled ‘Person permitted to serve,’ expressly provides who may serve the moving pleadings to a case: ‘A summons may be served by any person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the action.’  (§ 414.10, italic added.)

  “Here, on the face of the proof of service of summons, Braugh signed under penalty of perjury that she is ‘not a party to this action’ and attested to having personally served Dow on May 2, 2018 at the Property.

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  “We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Dow’s motion to set aside the default and default judgment.  On this record, the trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Dow due to improper service of the summons and complaint.  Dow was “under no duty to act upon a defectively served summons.”  (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.)  Because the court had no jurisdiction in light of defective service, we do not address Braugh’s remaining argument regarding equitable estoppel.”